UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

9-5-2012

State v. Skunkcap Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34746

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Skunkcap Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34746" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4403.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4403

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAH
STATE OF IDAHO,

Opy

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
JAMES LEROY SKUNKCAP,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 34746, 34747, 38249

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BANNOCK

HONORABLE PETER D. MCDERMOTT
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

SARAH E. TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT·APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1
1.

Docket No. 34746 ...................................................................... 1

2.

Docket No. 34747 ...................................................................... 2

3.

Joint Sentencing and AppeaL ..................................................... 2

4.

Docket No. 38249 ...................................................................... 2

ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 6
I.

II.

Skunkcap's Argument That The District Court Erred
By Instructing The Jury Using The Statutory Definition
Of The Word "Maliciously" Is Without Merit. ............................... 6
A.

Introduction ...................................................................... 6

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................ 7

C.

The District Court Did Not Err By Using The
Statutory Definition Of Maliciously ................................... 8

Skunkcap Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In
The Eluding Elements Instruction ............................................. 11
A.

Introduction .................................................................... 11

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... 12

C.

Skunkcap Has Failed To Establish Any, Much
Less All, Of The Elements Of Fundamental Error ......... 13

III.

Skunkcap's Claim Of Fundamental Error In The
Jury Instruction On The Elements Of Assault Is Barred
By The Invited Error Doctrine ................................................... 15

IV.

Skunkcap Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error
In The Testimony Of Officer Dalquist ....................................... 16
A.

Introduction .................................................................... 16

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... 16

C.

Skunkcap Has Raised, At Most, A Claim Of
Evidentiary Error And Has Therefore Failed
To Establish Fundamental Error .................................... 17

V.

Skunkcap's Claim Of Cumulative Error Is Meritless ................. 20

VI.

Skunkcap's Claim That The District Court Had
An Obligation To Inquire Into Alleged Conflicts
Of Interests Is Meritless ............................................................ 20

VII.

VIII.

A.

Introduction .................................................................... 20

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... 21

C.

The Complete Relevant Facts ....................................... 21

D.

Application Of The Correct Legal Standards
To The Facts Shows No Error ....................................... 24

Skunkcap Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error
In The Admission Of Evidence That Skunkcap Did
Not Give A Statement To Officers ............................................ 26
A.

Introduction .................................................................... 26

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... 27

C.

Skunkcap Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error ....... 27

Skunkcap's Argument That The District Court
Failed To Understand It Had Discretion To Run
The Enhanced Eluding Sentence Concurrently
Is Based On A Misrepresentation Of The Record .................... 31

ii

CONCLUSiON ............................................................................................... 33
CERTIFICATE OF SERViCE ........................................................................ 33

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) .............................................................. 24
Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994) ....................... 30
Holland v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 728, 518 P.2d 1190 (1974) ................................... 8
Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004) .......................................................... 14
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) ................................................................ 19
State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 170 P.3d 886 (2007) .................................... 14
State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816,864 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1993) ........................ 15
State v. Boothe, 103 Idaho 187, 646 P.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1982) .......................... 29
State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22,951 P.2d 1249 (1997) ............................................. 8
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,3 P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2000) ................... 13, 16,27
State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 606 P.2d 1000 (1980) ..................................... 21
State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576,261 P.3d 853 (2011) ............................ 12, 13, 14
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53,253 P.3d 727 (2011) ........................................ 28
Statev. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396,958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998) .......................... 20
State v. Herrera, 152 Idaho 24,266 P.3d 499 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................... 17
State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,227 P.3d 918 (2010) ...................................... 10
State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259,233 P.3d 190 (Ct. App. 2010) .................. 17, 27
State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884,276 P.3d 756 (Ct. App. 2012) ........................... 24
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003) ......................................... 24
State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 872 P.2d 708 (1994) ...................................... 20
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 965 P.2d 174 (1998) ......................................... 28

iv

State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667,862 P.2d 1089 (Ct. App. 1993) .......................... 9
State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712,52 P.3d 857 (2002) .............................................. 21
State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 254 P.3d 77 (Ct. App. 2011) ................. 15, 17,18
State v. Nunes, 131 Idaho 408,958 P.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1998) ............................... 9
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010) ................................... passim
Statev. Pina, 149 Idaho 140,233 P.3d 71 (2010) .............................................. 12
State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6,909 P.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1995) ................................ 21
State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 955 P.2d 1082 (1998) ............................................ 8
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355,247 P.3d 582 (2010) ................................ 12
State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457,767 P.2d 832 (Ct. App. 1989) ................... 16, 27
State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 178 P.3d 644 (2007) ..................................... 28
State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 233 P.3d 1286 (Ct. App. 2010) ...................... 19
State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 64 P.3d 296 (2002) ....................................... 8, 12

STATUTES
I. C. § 18-1 01 (4) ............................................................................................... 8, 10
I.C. § 18-7001 ....................................................................................................... 9
I.C. § 49-1404(1) ................................................................................................. 14

RULES
I.C.R. 30(b) ......................................................................................................... 13
I.R.E. 401 ............................................................................................................ 18
I.R.E. 402 ............................................................................................................ 18
I.R.E. 403 ............................................................................................................ 18
I.R.E. 404(b) ........................................................................................................ 18

v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Skunkcap appeals from his convictions for eluding with a persistent
violator enhancement, grand theft with a persistent violator enhancement, and
misdemeanor convictions for malicious injury to property and assault.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
1.

Docket No. 34746
When officers tried to stop him at the scene of a narcotics surveillance,

Skunkcap fled, striking two police cars with his own vehicle. (#34746 R., vol. I,
pp. 19-23.) The state charged Skunkcap with felony eluding, malicious injury to
property, possession of methamphetamine, grand theft by possession, and
aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. (#34746 R., vol. I, pp. 78-80.)
The state later amended to add an Information Part II charging an enhancement
for being a persistent violator.

(#34746 R., vol. I, pp. 146-48; voL, II, p. 220.)

The case proceeded to trial where the jury acquitted Skunkcap of grant theft and
possession of methamphetamine and convicted him for felony eluding, malicious
injury to property (for hitting an officer's car a second time) and an included
offense of misdemeanor simple assault.

(#34746 R., vol. II, pp. 224-28.)

Skunkcap thereafter entered a guilty plea to the persistent violator enhancement.
(#34746 R., vol. II, p. 279.)
After trial Skunkcap filed a motion to reduce the felony malicious injury to
property conviction to a misdemeanor, which the district court granted on the
basis that the evidence had not established the value of the damage to the
1

property caused by the second hit to the officer's car. (#34746 R, vol. II, pp.
291-92, 295-300.)
2.

Docket No. 34747
Skunkcap stole two saddles. (#34747 R, pp. 16-21.) The state charged

him with grand theft. (#34747 R, pp. 48-49.) The state later charged a persistent
violator sentencing enhancement. (#34747 R, pp. 149-52, 158-59.) The jury
found Skunkcap guilty as charged, and he pled guilty to the persistent violator
enhancement.
3.

(#34747 R, pp. 201-02.)

Joint Sentencing and Appeal
At a joint sentencing on both cases the district court imposed consecutive

sentences of 18 years with eight years determinate on the enhanced eluding and
grand theft convictions, respectively. (#34746 R, Vol. II, pp. 305-09; #34747 R,
pp. 204-08.) The court imposed 6 months on the misdemeanor malicious injury
to property and three months on the misdemeanor assault, and granted credit for
time already served, fully executing both sentences. (#34746 R., Vol. II, p. 306.)
Skunkcap filed timely notices of appeal from the district court's judgments
in November of 2007. (#34746 R, Vol. II, pp. 313-15; #34747 R, pp. 209-11.)
The record was settled July 18, 2008 and this Court ordered Skunkcap's brief
filed by August 22,2008. (Supreme Court Notice (7/18/08).)
4.

Docket No. 38249
On December 4, 2009, while the appeals in the other dockets were still

pending, Skunkcap filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the sentencing
enhancement entered in the eluding case, Bannock County Case No. CR-2006-

2

20842-FE-C (Docket No. 34746), on the basis that the plea was not knowing and
voluntary because the district court had misstated the penalty at a prior hearing.
(#38249 R, pp. 1-20.) The court granted the motion. (#38249 R, pp. 24-25.)
After securing Skunkcap a trial on the persistent violator enhancement, counsel
for Skunkcap moved to withdraw on the basis that counsel had failed to correct
the court's misstatement about the penalty associated with the persistent violator
enhancement. (#38249 R, pp. 26-27.) The court denied the motion. (#38249

R, pp. 28-29.) After a trial, the jury convicted Skunkcap of being a persistent
violator. (#38249 R, pp. 107-12.) The court entered judgment on the persistent
violator conviction, ordering a "subsequent indeterminate term of seven (7)
years."

(#38249 R, pp. 114-16 (capitalization altered and bolding omitted).)

Skunkcap filed a notice of appeal from the new judgment. (#38249 R, pp. 12225.)
Skunkcap also filed a Rule 35 motion claiming that the new sentence was
illegal because the entire sentence was necessarily vacated upon granting the
motion to withdraw the plea. (#38249 R, pp. 119-21.) The district court agreed,
and then reinstated the original sentence. (#38249 R, pp. 134-35.)

3

ISSUES
Skunkcap states the issues on appeal on page 25 of the Appellant's brief.
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

During deliberations the jury in docket number 34746 asked, in relation to
the malicious injury to property count, whether it had to find that Skunkcap
intended the damage. The district court referred the jury to the instruction
containing the statutory definition of malice. Has Skunkcap failed to show
that the district court erred by instructing the jury using the statutory
definition of the word "maliciously"?

2.

During the trial on eluding the district court used a jury instruction that
contained the statutory language that the signal to stop must be the sort of
signal that a reasonable person would understand to be a signal to stop.
Has Skunkcap failed to show fundamental error in the use of the statutory
language?

3.

The district court used the jury instruction on the elements of assault
submitted by Skunkcap. On appeal Skunkcap claims that the use of his
instruction was fundamental error. Is his claim barred by the invited error
doctrine?

4.

At the trial on the eluding charge a detective testified that he took
"aggressive action" to box Skunkcap in after Skunkcap had already struck
a police car because Skunkcap had demonstrated disregard for the safety
of the officers and others. Has Skunkcap failed to show fundamental error
in this testimony?

5.

The cumulative error doctrine applies only to preserved claims of error.
Skunkcap asserts only one preserved claim of error in docket number
34746. Is Skunkcap's claim of cumulative error inapplicable as a matter of
law?

6.

When asked whether he was satisfied with the performance of his counsel
in relation to entering a guilty plea to being a persistent violator Skunkcap
stated certain dissatisfaction but did not request a substitution of counsel.
Different counsel later moved to withdraw, but the district court denied that
motion after rejecting its factual basis. Has Skunkcap failed to show that
the district court had some sort of duty to conduct further factual inquiry
into counsel's performance?

4

7.

Evidence that Skunkcap refused to talk to police was admitted at the trial
on the grand theft charge. Skunkcap claims on appeal that this was
fundamental error. Although the evidence was improperly presented, has
Skunkcap failed to show fundamental error where the evidence of
Skunkcap's guilt is overwhelming and the jury was instructed to not hold
the lack of a statement to police against Skunkcap?

8.

Skunkcap's Rule 35 motion claimed his sentence was illegal and also
requested leniency. The record shows that the district court granted the
part of the Rule 35 motion claiming an illegal sentence and denied only
Skunkcap's request for leniency. Is Skunkcap's claim the district court
erred by denying his claim of an illegal sentence without merit because it
is based on incorrect reading of the record?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Skunkcap's Argument That The District Court Erred By Instructing The Jury
Using The Statutory Definition Of The Word "Maliciously" Is Without Merit
A.

Introduction
While attempting to elude other officers, Skunkcap rammed into Detective

Collins' Ford Escape, which the detective had positioned across a road to block
traffic from entering the area of the pursuit. (#34746 Tr., p. 80, Ls. 7-10; p. 82, L.
20 - p. 85, L. 25; p. 172, L. 14 - p. 178, L. 4; p. 204, L. 10 - p. 211, L. 24.)
Skunkcap then backed his car into a pursuing police truck driven by Sergeant
Dalquist. (#34746 Tr., p. 86, Ls. 15-19; p. 178, Ls. 4-8; p. 178, L. 16 - p. 179, L.
15; p. 211, L. 25 - p. 213, L. 14.) Skunkcap, boxed in but still trying to get away,
drove forward and struck Detective Collins' car a second time. (#34746 Tr., p.
86, L. 20 - p. 87, L. 2; p. 178, Ls. 8-10.) For this conduct the state charged
Skunkcap with felony malicious injury to property. (#34746 R., vol. I, p. 79.)
The district court instructed the jury on the elements of malicious injury to
property. (#34746 R., vol. II, p. 246.) In "Instruction No. 17" the district court
defined "maliciously" as "the desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to do
a wrongful act." (#34746 R., vol. II, p. 247.) During deliberations the jury sent
the court the following questions:
Instruction 17, definition of maliciously.
If the act (the second hit of the Collins vehicle) was done due to an
effort to escape is that malicious?, [sic] or does it mean that the
damage was the intent, not the escape.
When committing a wrongful act is any unintentional damage
considered malicious?

6

(#34746 R, vol. II, p. 281.) After hearing arguments from the parties (#34746
Tr., p. 514, L. 4 - p. 522, L. 12), the district court instructed the jury that it should
re-read the definition of "maliciously" already provided, but that they could
differentiate between the different collisions in determining malice, and that if
they determined that not all of the collisions were done maliciously they could so
indicate on the verdict form (#34746 Tr., p. 522, L. 22 - p. 527, L. 2). The jury
found Skunkcap guilty of malicious injury to property in relation to when he
rammed Detective Collins' Ford Escape the second time. (#34746 R, vol. II, p.
284.) Later the district court reduced the conviction to a misdemeanor because
the state had not proved that this second collision had caused over $1000 in
damage.

(#34746 R, vol. II, pp. 291-92, 295-300.)

The sentence for this

conviction was six months already served. (#34746 R., vol. II, p. 306.)
Skunkcap seeks reversal of his misdemeanor malicious injury to property
conviction, arguing that the district court erred by failing to "properly instruct the
jury that the mens rea of malice is specific to the intent to damage the property."
(Appellant's brief, p. 27.) Skunkcap fails to acknowledge that the definition given
the jury was straight out of the Idaho C,?de. Having failed to demonstrate that the
legislature adopted an erroneous definition of malice, Skunkcap has failed to
show error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether the jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and

state the applicable law is a question of law over which this Court exercises free

7

review. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249, 1259 (1997). When
this Court reviews jury instructions, it must first determine whether the
instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect the
applicable law. State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303,310,955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998).
An instruction is not error unless it misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining
party.

kL.

C.

The District Court Did Not Err By Using The Statutory Definition Of
Maliciously
"Generally giving [a jury] instruction in statutory language is not error."

State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370,373,64 P.3d 296, 299 (2002). See also Holland
v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 728,730-731,518 P.2d 1190,1192-93 (1974) (holding that
there was no error in the jury instructions when the trial court used, verbatim, the
language from the statute). The definition of "maliciously" provided in the jury
instructions was the same definition provided in the model instructions and the
Idaho Code.

(Compare #34746 R., vol. II, p. 247 with ICJI 1301, I.C. § 18-

101 (4).) Skunkcap fails to even acknowledge that the instruction he challenges
was taken straight out of the applicable statute. (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-31.)
Because the jury was correctly instructed on the definition of "maliciously" as
adopted by the Idaho Legislature, there was no error in the jury instructions.
Even ignoring Skunkcap's failure to acknowledge that the language he
challenges comes straight out of the applicable statute, Skunkcap's argument
fails. The cases he primarily relies on addressed the distinction between merely
negligent conduct and malice, an issue not presented in this case. They do not
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support Skunkcap's argument that malicious injury to property requires specific
intent instead of malice as the mental state element.
In State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, 862 P.2d 1089 (Ct. App. 1993), Nastoff
was operating an illegally modified chain saw which emitted hot carbon that
smoldered for two days until it caught fire and burned five acres of timber. The
court, after analyzing the statutory definition of malice, concluded that intent to do
any wrongful act that happens to cause property damage is not enough, but that
"culpability for malicious injury to property" lies "only where the defendant's
conduct causing the injury is accompanied by an intent to injure property of
another."

Nastoff, 124 Idaho at 670, 862 P.2d at 1092. This reasoning was

based on the basic law that there must be a union of act and intent, and therefore
a defendant must have "harbored the intent to knowingly injure real or personal
property."

.!!L

To hold otherwise would base guilt upon mere negligence .

.!!L

In State v. Nunes, 131 Idaho 408, 958 P.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1998), Nunes
was trying to steal gas, tried to break a lock to that end, but instead broke a valve
on the tank, causing it to leak 250 gallons of gas and causing an ensuing
cleanup.

Nunes argued his case was controlled by Nastoff, but the Court of

Appeals found that case "inapposite."

.!!L

at 409, 958 P.2d at 35. The court

characterized the holding of Nastoff: "in using the term 'maliciously' in I.C. § 187001, the legislature did not intend to proscribe and punish merely negligent
conduct."

.!!L

Because Nunes did intend to damage the property at issue, even if

he did not intend for the gasoline to spill, he was not merely negligent.
10,958 P.2d at 35-36.
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.!!L at 409-

Skunkcap claims that the lesson of these two cases is that "the State was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had the specific intent to
injure or damage the cars with which he collided."

(Appellant's brief, p. 28

(emphasis added).) This is incorrect. Neither case talks about specific intent.
Rather, both cases were merely interpreting I.C. § 18-101 (4)'s language defining
malice, not re-writing it to require specific intent in lieu of malice.

In addition,

neither case even addressed the proper language of jury instructions, much less
held that an instruction using the statutory language would be erroneous. The
Nunes and Nastoff opinions, by their express terms, only distinguished between
conduct that was merely negligent (Nastoff's chainsaw) and that which was
intentional (Nunes' breaking of a gas tank).
Here there was no reasonable view of the evidence indicating that
Skunkcap did not act intentionally when he rammed the two stopped police cars.
There is especially no reason to believe that the act for which he was convicted,
ramming the stopped police car for a second time was merely negligent and not
intentional. 1

Indeed, Skunkcap does not argue his conduct was reasonably

viewed as merely negligent, but argues that he had to have the "specific intent" of
property damage, apparently contending that the state had to prove his motive (if
he rammed the car with intent of fleeing instead of causing damage then he
would not be guilty), a proposition without any reasonable basis in law. The jury

1 For this reason any error was also harmless. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,
669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010). Indeed, Skunkcap probably benefited from the
court's instruction which did not preclude the jury from acquitting even if he
intentionally rammed the police cars if his motive was to escape rather than
cause damage to those cars.

10

was instructed using the statutory definition of "maliciously" and Skunkcap has
neither argued nor demonstrated that such language was erroneous.

II.
Skunkcap Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Eluding Elements
Instruction
A.

Introduction
The district court instructed the jury on the elements of eluding, including

the element that Skunkcap "[d]id willfully flee or attempt to elude a pursuing
police vehicle" and that the eluding must be contemporaneous with "a visual or
audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop."

(#34746 R., vol. II, p. 245.)

Between the enumerated elements and the instruction that the crime must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court included the following
sentence: "** It is sufficient proof that a reasonable person who knew or should
have known that the visual or audible signal given by a peace officer was
intended to bring [the] pursued vehicle to a stop."

(#34746 R., vol. II, p. 245.)

With the exception of the two asterisks and the bracketed word omitted from the
instruction, this sentence is the same as found in the eluding statute, Idaho Code
section 49-1404(1). Similar language appears in the model jury instruction on
felony eluding, after the language about proving each element beyond a
reasonable doubt. ICJI 1032 ("The signal to stop must be given by emergency
lights or siren which a reasonable person knew or should have known was
intended to bring the pursued vehicle to a stop."). Skunkcap did not object to this
instruction. (#34746 Tr., p. 409, L. 9 - p. 411, L. 18.)

11

On appeal Skunkcap argues that the challenged sentence "relieved the
State of its constitutional burden [of proving] beyond a reasonable doubt" that he
willfully eluded the police by creating an impermissible "presumption ... that it is
sufficient proof for the charged offense of felony eluding if the jury believes that a
reasonable person knew or would have known that he or she was being signaled
to stop" (Appellant's brief, pp. 31-35) and removing the state's burden of proving
he "had some knowledge that he was being signaled to stop" (Appellant's brief,
p. 38).

This argument fails because Skunkcap's reading of the challenged

instruction as modifying the requirement that the state prove he willfully eluded
the police is patently unreasonable.

The only reasonable reading of the

instruction is that the challenged sentence related only to the element of a police
signal to stop the vehicle, the exact element to which it pertained.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587, 261
P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011); State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 147, 233 P.3d 71, 78
(2010); State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002).

"An

erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as
a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261
P.3d at 865 (quoting State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582,
600-01 (2010».
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C.

Skunkcap Has Failed To Establish Any, Much Less All, Of The Elements
Of Fundamental Error
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). See also
State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011) ("An error
generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on appeal." (citations and
internal quotations omitted)). This same principle applies to alleged errors in jury
instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) ("No party may assign as error the giving of or
failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the party
objects and the grounds of the objection."); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d
at 865.

Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only

review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. Draper, 151 Idaho
at 588, 261 P.3d at 365; State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979
(2010).
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Skunkcap to
demonstrate that the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228,245 P.3d at 980. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated
that a jury instruction that relieves the state of its duty to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the crime charged violates the
13

defendant's right to due process.

Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865

(citing Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004); State v. Anderson, 144
Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007)). Skunkcap has, however, failed to
establish a due process violation, much less the other elements of his
fundamental error claim.
The language Skunkcap challenges for the first time on appeal is identical
to the language of the statute (with the exception of an omitted "the"). (Compare
#34746 R., vol. II, p. 245 with I.C. § 49-1404(1)). It is similar to the language
used in the model jury instruction. (Compare #34746 R., vol. II, p. 245 with ICJI
1032.) Skunkcap provides no explanation whatsoever of how the same or similar
language as used in the challenged instruction leads to a wildly different
interpretation than would apply to the statute or the model instruction.

(See

Appellant's brief, pp. 31-38.) Skunkcap has failed to cite any case in which an
instruction using the statutory language applicable to the crime has risen to a
violation of due process.
More importantly, Skunkcap's arguments simply do not withstand scrutiny.
Skunkcap's argument that the language creates a presumption of guilt is directly
contrary to the language of the instruction, after the elements and the challenged
sentence, that "[i]f any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty."

(#34746 R., vol. II, p. 245

(emphasis added).) His claim that the jury did not have to find his conduct willful
is directly contrary to the language of the instruction that the crime was to
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"willfully flee or attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle," which had to be

proven "beyond a reasonable doubt." (Id. (emphasis added).)
Read in its totality, the challenged instruction accomplishes the same thing
as the statute and the model instruction using the statutory language.

The

instruction merely informed the jury that the signal used by the police needed to
be the type of signal that a reasonable person would understand was intended to
bring the pursued vehicle to a stop. No reasonable reading of the statute leads
to the conclusion that the challenged language addressed, much less diminished,
the state's burden of proving that the eluding or fleeing was willful.

Skunkcap

has failed to show error, much less constitutional error that is clear on the record
and demonstrably prejudicial.

III.
Skunkcap's Claim Of Fundamental Error In The Jury Instruction On The
Elements Of Assault Is Barred By The Invited Error Doctrine
The district court gave the jury instruction on the elements of assault
submitted by the defense.

(Compare #34746 R., vol. II, p. 210 (instruction

submitted by defense, checked "given") with p. 262 (instruction challenged on
appeal).)

On appeal Skunkcap contends the instruction he submitted to the

district court, which the district court then used at trial, is fundamentally
erroneous.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 41-44.)

Because it was the instruction

Skunkcap asked the district court to use he is stopped from claiming its use was
erroneous. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,187,254 P.3d 77,88 (Ct. App. 2011)
("The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error
when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error.") (citing State
15

v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816,819,864 P.2d 654,657 (Ct. App. 1993». This issue
should be rejected under the invited error doctrine.

IV.

Skunkcap Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Testimony Of Officer
Dalguist
A.

Introduction
During his testimony Officer Dalquist testified he took "aggressive action"

to "pull right behind the suspect vehicle ... in an attempt to pin him in and keep
him from going anywhere" because, after observing Skunkcap ram Detective
Collins' car, he concluded Skunkcap did not "have any regard" for the safety of
the officers "or anybody out on the street that day." (#34746 Tr., p. 211, L. 1 - p.
212, L. 22.)

Skunkcap did not object to this testimony_

(Id.)

On appeal

Skunkcap claims this testimony constituted prosecutorial misconduct amounting
to fundamental error.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 44-48.)

Skunkcap's attempt to

convert claims of evidentiary error at trial, which are by definition not viable
claims of fundamental error, into claims of prosecutorial misconduct so that he
can claim fundamental error should be rejected.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether an
issue was preserved presents a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho
457,459,767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989).
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C.

Skunkcap Has Raised, At Most, A Claim Of Evidentiary Error And Has
Therefore Failed To Establish Fundamental Error
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if the appellant
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d

establishes fundamental error.

961,976 (2010); State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 254 P.3d 77 (Ct. App. 2011);
State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). In the
absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a
fair tribunal."

Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976.

Review without

objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that "one or more of
the

defendant's

unwaived

constitutional

rights

were

violated;"

(2)

the

constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for any
additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to object
was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a reasonable
probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings."

~

at 225,245 P.3d at 977. Skunkcap has failed to meet his burden of showing any,
much less all, of these elements.
First, the error complained of is not constitutional.

Even assuming the

testimony in question was objectionable, mere presentation of inadmissible
evidence is not a constitutional error. State v. Herrera, 152 Idaho 24, _ , 266
P.3d 499, 508-509 (Ct. App. 2011) (inadmissibility of opinion testimony about the
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truthfulness of other witnesses governed by rules of evidence, not Constitution);
State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 182, 254 P.3d 77, 83-84 (Ct. App. 2011)
(concluding "the requirements set forth in I.R.E. 404(b), regarding admissibility
and notice, are not of constitutional import" and noting prior cases rejecting
claims that evidentiary error rises to the level of fundamental error).

Even

assuming the testimony was irrelevant (I.R.E. 401, 402) or unfairly prejudicial
(I.R.E. 403) such states no more than a claim under Idaho's rules of evidence.
Skunkcap argues that the testimony of the police officer "must be
attributed to the State" and therefore the state attempted to secure a conviction
by the prosecutorial misconduct of an "appeal to the jurors' fears." (Appellant's
brief, p. 46.)

Even ascribing the officer's challenged testimony to the state,

however, does not elevate it from an evidentiary question to a constitutional
violation. The constitutional question is whether the state "attempt[ed] to secure
a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and
the evidence admitted during triaL" Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979.
The officer's mention that his motivation for taking aggressive action to box
Skunkcap in was Skunkcap's apparent disregard for the safety of others, without
more, simply does not rise to the level of the state attempting to secure a verdict
on factors other than the defendant's guilt. The challenged testimony presents
only an evidentiary issue, not a constitutional error.
Even if the challenged testimony could reasonably be seen to raise a
question of whether the state was attempting to secure a conviction on a basis
other than Skunkcap's guilt, the answer to such question is not clear on the

18

record. Skunkcap makes no claim that the prosecutor mentioned the testimony
in closing argument or that any other testimony on the subject was ever
introduced. One isolated incident simply does not make clear that this was an
unfair trial. See State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 367, 233 P.3d 1286, 1289 (Ct.
App. 2010) ("A fair trial is not necessarily a perfect triaL"); Smith v. Phillips, 455
U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (the "touchstone" of due process is the fairness of the trial).
Likewise, the record does not establish that the isolated testimony in
question did not draw an objection because of tactical choice.

Indeed, the

defense attorney could easily have concluded that the testimony was not so
damaging as to merit an objection, or even that the testimony about the officer's
reasons for taking certain actions at the time in question was not objectionable.
Finally, Skunkcap has failed to show prejudice. Given the evidence that
Skunkcap attempted to elude the police and struck two different cars a total of
three times, the officer's opinion that Skunkcap was acting without regard to
others' safety can hardly be characterized as overwhelmingly prejudicial.

In

addition, Skunkcap's argument that this Court can conclude that the jury's verdict
was the product of prejudice because the jury acquitted him on many of the
charges, either outright or finding him guilty on lesser offenses (Appellant's brief,
p. 47), is illogical.
To establish fundamental error Skunkcap has the burden of demonstrating
constitutional error that is clear on the record (including that the lack of objection
was not tactical) and prejudice. Skunkcap's claim of fundamental error related to
Officer Oalquist's testimony fails on all three prongs.
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V.
Skunkcap's Claim Of Cumulative Error Is Meritless
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

State v.

Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). The cumulative
error analysis does not include errors neither objected to nor found fundamental.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010). Because any
finding of fundamental error requires reversal without regard to cumulation, and
because Skunkcap has raised on appeal only one preserved claim of error, by
definition the cumulative error doctrine does not apply in this case.

VI.
Skunkcap's Claim That The District Court Had An Obligation To Inquire Into
Alleged Conflicts Of Interests Is Meritless
A.

Introduction
Skunkcap asserts that the district court failed to conduct an adequate

inquiry into potential conflicts of interests between him and his trial attorneys.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 49-55.) Application of the correct legal standards to the
complete facts shown by the record demonstrates this claim to be meritless
because the district had no duty to conduct an inquiry.
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B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court may appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant upon

a showing of good cause; such decision lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court. State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712,714-715,52 P.3d 857, 859-860 (2002);
State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980). An abuse of
discretion will only be found if the denial of such a motion results in the
abridgment of the accused's right to counsel. State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 11,
909 P.2d 624, 629 (Ct. App. 1995).

C.

The Complete Relevant Facts
The state filed the complaint in docket number 34746 on November 15,

2006, and public defender Randal Schulthies was appointed to represent
Skunkcap that same day.

(#34746 R., vol. I, p. 6.)

Schulthies represented

Skunkcap thereafter (#34746 R., vol. I, pp. 140, 142), including the jury trial
(#34746 R., vol. II, p. 221), and the post-trial motion to reduce or for new trial
(#34746 R., vol. II, pp. 293).

The state filed the complaint in docket number

34747 on November 30, 2006, and Schulthies was appointed to represent
Skunkcap shortly after Skunkcap's arrest.

(#34747 R., p. 6.)

Schulthies

represented Skunkcap thereafter (#34747 R., pp. 46,50,62, 158, 161, 165, 172
("Kent V. Reynolds for Randall D. Schulthies")), including a jury trial ending in a
mistrial when Schulthies was taken to the emergency room and unable to
continue (#34747 R., pp. 177-83).
Shortly after the mistrial in docket number 34747, on August 2, 2007,
Schulthies moved to withdraw as counsel for Skunkcap in both cases on the
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basis that Skunkcap had accused Schulthies of lying to him. (#34746 R, vol. II,
pp. 301-02; #34747 R, pp. 184-85; #34746 Tr., p. 557, L. 7 - p. 558, L. 18;
#34747 Tr., p. 204, L. 7 - p. 205, L. 18.) Skunkcap asserted that his accusations
that Schulthies had lied to him were accurate, but he opposed the motion to
withdraw. (#34746 Tr., p. 558, L. 20 - p. 562, L. 10; #34747 Tr., p. 205, L. 20 p. 209, L. 10.) Skunkcap stated, ''I'm satisfied with [Schulthies] with what he
does, you know." (#34746 Tr., p. 561, Ls. 16-17; #34747 Tr., p.208, Ls. 16-17.)
The district court nevertheless granted the motion because it would not be
appropriate to

"force"

Schulthies to

continue

representation

under the

circumstances. (#34746 R, vol. II, pp. 303-04; #34747 R, pp. 186-87; #34746
Tr., p. 565, Ls. 8-16; #34747 Tr., p. 212, Ls. 8-16.) The court appointed John
Dewey and Randy Smith, also with the public defender's office, to represent
Skunkcap going forward. (#34746 R, vol. II, pp. 303-04; #34747 R, pp. 186-87;
#34746 Tr., p. 565, Ls. 8-16; #34747 Tr., p. 212, Ls. 8-16.)
Dewey and Smith thereafter represented Skunkcap at the trial in docket
number 34747.

(#34747 R, pp. 195-203.)

At the conclusion of the trial

Skunkcap entered a guilty plea to the persistent violator enhancement. (#34747
Tr., p. 468, L. 18 - p. 475, L. 18.) As part of the plea colloquy the district court
asked Skunkcap if he had "problems with the way [his] attorney ha[d]
represented [him]."

(#34747 Tr., p. 471, Ls. 14-16.)

Skunkcap claimed that

Schulthies had been "trying to get off [his] case," had not shown up in court, that
his speedy trial rights had been violated and that current counsel had spent only
"two hours, total" with him in preparation for the trial just competed. (#34747 Tr.,
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p. 471, L. 17 - p. 472, L. 3.) Skunkcap concluded his comments, "That's alii got
to say, sir. Thank you." (#34747 Tr., p. 472, Ls. 4-5.)
It turns out that it was not all he had to say, however. At the conclusion of
the hearing the court asked if Skunkcap had comments or questions and
Skunkcap responded that he felt like "a lot of' his rights had been violated by
Schulthies, and that his current counsel could not bring it up because they could
not "slam their boss." (#34747 Tr., p. 476, L. 9 - p. 477, L. 1.) The district court
reminded him that he had opposed Schulthies' motion to withdraw and had
stated he was satisfied with Schulthies' representation. (#34747 Tr., p. 477, Ls.
2~16.)

Skunkcap agreed that he had wanted Schulthies' representation because

he felt he was the best representation he was going to get as an indigent
defendant, but still felt he was not "fairly defended," citing the two hours Dewy
and Smith had spent with him preparing for trial.

(#34747 Tr., p. 477, L. 17 - p.

478, L. 9.) The court observed that he thought Dewey and Smith had done an
"excellent job" in the trial and Skunkcap said, "Yes, they did." (#34747 Tr., p.
478, Ls. 10-18.)
After Skunkcap, through counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea
to the persistent violator enhancement in docket number 34746 on the basis that
the court had misstated the applicable penalty at the November 15, 2006 initial
appearance (#38249 R., pp. 1-20), attorney Dewey moved to withdraw as
counsel (#38249 R., pp. 26-27).

The basis of the motion was that it was

"theoretically possible that [Skunkcap] could allege that [Schulthies] should have
corrected the misstatement of the law made by the Court" and that Dewey "works
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for" Schulthies, creating a "direct conflict." (#38249 R., pp. 26-27.) The district
court heard the motion to withdraw as counsel before taking up the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea. (#38249 R., pp. 31-32; #38249 Tr. p. 12, Ls. 12-18.)
Skunkcap was not present.

(#38249 R., p.

31.)

After hearing the

representations of counsel,2 the district court denied the motion to withdraw as
counsel on the basis that there was no conflict. (#38249 Tr., p. 12, L. 19 - p. 16,
L. 2.)

D.

Application Of The Correct Legal Standards To The Facts Shows No Error
The district court must conduct an inquiry into whether different counsel

should be appointed in two circumstances. First, "[w]henever a trial court knows
or reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist, the trial court has
a duty of inquiry" to ensure that criminal defendants are not deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 347 (1980). Second, a court must also "conduct a meaningful inquiry" to
determine whether a defendant's motion for substitute counsel is supported by
good cause.

State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, 276 P.3d 756 (Ct. App. 2012).

Neither of these circumstances applies in this case.

Counsel clarified that the misstatement about the sentence by the court
occurred at the initial appearance, so it was "unlikely that there was an attorney
from the Public Defender's Office [appointed] at that time." (#38249 Tr. p. 13, Ls.
5-15.) The transcript of the initial appearance held November 15, 2006 confirms
that no attorney representing Skunkcap was present at that time. (See #34746
11/15/06 Tr.)
2
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First, Skunkcap never expressed a desire for substitute counsel.
Skunkcap opposed Schulthies' motion to withdraw.

He did make some

complaints about Schulthies', Dewey's, and Smith's representation when
specifically asked by the court about counsel's representation in a guilty plea
colloquy, but never indicated any desire to substitute counsel. Skunkcap did not
trigger the court's duty of inquiry by -requesting substitute counsel because he
never requested substitute counsel.

Second, there is nothing in the record indicating that the trial court knew,
or should have known, that a particular conflict may have existed.

Skunkcap

never asserted "problems" with counsel that were as a result of a conflict of
interests (as opposed to a general feeling that counsel was not being as diligent
as Skunkcap would have liked).

Likewise, Dewey's subsequent motion to

withdraw was denied based on a specific factual finding, uncontested on appeal,
that there was in fact no conflict of interests.
Skunkcap assumes on appeal that the duty of inquiry is triggered
whenever a defendant complains about his attorney. Such is not the law. To
hold otherwise would represent a huge, and unjustified, expansion of the law.
The duty to inquire is triggered only by a request for substitute counselor if the
court has reason to believe a conflict of interests may exist. Here Skunkcap did
not request substitute counsel (quite the opposite) and none of his complaints
were of a conflict of interest (as opposed to generalized feelings his attorneys
should have been more diligent). Skunkcap's challenge to the adequacy of the
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inquiry thus fails because the duty to inquire was never triggered in the first
place.

VII.
Skunkcap Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Admission Of
Evidence That Skunkcap Did Not Give A Statement To Officers
A.

Introduction
Lori Bowers, an employee of Vickers Western Store, saw Skunkcap

putting a saddle in the trunk of a car. (#34747 Tr., p. 242, L. 1 - p. 247, L. 11; p.
250, L. 15 - p. 252, L. 24.) The car was next to a trailer owned by Mr. Vickers,
and the door of the trailer that was usually closed had been opened. (#34747
Tr., p. 246, L. 18 - p. 248, L. 16.) Lori wrote down the license number of the car,
contacted another store employee and learned there had been no saddle sales
that day, and alerted Mr. Vickers so he could check the trailer. (#34747 Tr., p.
252, L. 25 - p. 254, L. 2; p. 259, Ls. 10-16.) Mr. Vickers confirmed that the trailer
had been opened up and two saddles stolen. (#34747 Tr., p. 294, L. 14 - p. 308,
L. 9.) Security cameras at the store recorded the presence of the car. (#34747

Tr., p. 308, L. 14 - p. 323, L. 17; State's Exhibit F.) Skunkcap tried to enlist
Clyde Dixey to sell the stolen saddles. (#34747 Tr., p. 386, L. 23 - p. 396, L. 4.)
A few days after the theft officers arrested Skunkcap driving the car involved in
the theft. (#34747 Tr., p. 348, L. 22 - p. 355, L. 16; p. 369, L. 9 - p. 375, L. 25.)
During the trial the prosecutor elicited testimony from Detective Nelson
that when he asked Skunkcap for an interview Skunkcap responded, "I'm not
fucking talking to you guys."

(#34747 Tr., p. 405, L. 18 - p. 407, L. 19.)

Skunkcap did not object to this line of questioning.
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(Id.)

The district court,

however, specifically instructed the jury that "people have the right[,] if they
want[,] to not talk to the police, and so I don't want you to hold it against Mr.
Skunkcap that he wouldn't give a statement." (#34747 Tr., p. 409, Ls. 7-10.)
Skunkcap neither objected to the testimony nor requested a mistrial after the trial
court gave its curative instruction. (#34747 Tr., p. 404, L. 14 - p. 412, L. 10.)
On appeal Skunkcap claims presentation of testimony about the
attempted interview was fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 60-67.) He
has failed, however, to show prejudice in light of the district court's instruction
and the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether
the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho
457,459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989).

C.

Skunkcap Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection

may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error." State v.
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010).

In the

absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a
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fair tribunaL" State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010).
Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that
"one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2)
the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for
any additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the
error affected the defendant's sUbstantial rights," generally by showing a
reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court
proceedings."

lit at 226,

245 P.3d at 978. Skunkcap has failed to demonstrate

prejudice.
Although there is a split among the federal courts on the use of preMiranda silence at trial, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that, because the

right to silence is always present, it violates a defendant's rights to use his
silence either before or after Miranda warnings as evidence of his guilt. State v.
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820, 965 P.2d 174, 180 (1998); see also State v.
Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 290-91, 178 P.3d 644, 655-56 (2007). It is therefore
error where, as here, the prosecutor presents evidence that the defendant
invoked his right to silence in response to an attempted police interview. State v.
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60-61, 253 P.3d 727, 734-35 (2011).
Skunkcap has, however, failed to demonstrate that the error probably
affected the outcome of the trial.

First, the evidence of Skunkcap's guilt is

overwhelming. An eyewitness saw him stealing the saddles; video of the crime
scene puts the car he was driving at the scene; and he was trying to sell a saddle
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shortly after the theft. Skunkcap points out that the eyewitness did not identify
him in a photographic lineup, that his family owned some saddles, and that the
stolen saddles were never recovered (Appellant's brief, p. 64), but ignores the
fact that surveillance video and the eyewitness also put the car he was driving at
the time at the scene of the theft and the attempt to recruit help selling the
saddle.

Even if Skunkcap's challenges to parts of the case against him are

accepted, the unchallenged evidence still shows that someone matching
Skunkcap's general description, and driving the car Skunkcap was using at the
time, stole the saddles very shortly before Skunkcap tried to clandestinely sell a
saddle.

The odds that someone other than Skunkcap stole the saddles are

vanishingly small. Skunkcap's challenge to the evidence simply does not create
the type of doubt that he must establish to show a reasonable probability of a
different result under the fundamental error standard.
Second, the district court instructed the jury that there is a right to not talk
to the police and "I don't want you to hold it against Mr. Skunkcap that he
WOUldn't give a statement."

(#34747 Tr., p. 409, Ls. 6-10.)

"Error in the

admission of evidence may be cured by proper instruction, and it must be
presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court's direction to disregard entirely the
objectional testimony." State v. Boothe, 103 Idaho 187, 646 P.2d 429 (Ct. App.
1982). Skunkcap claims the instruction was "inadequate as a matter of law" but
cites to no relevant law in support of that claim.

(Appellant's brief, p. 65.)

Indeed, it is common to give an instruction for juries not to consider a defendant's
exercise of the right to silence when the jury personally witnesses that exercise
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when the defendant does not testify at trial. See,~, Gabourie v. State, 125
Idaho 254, 259-60, 869 P.2d 571, 576-77 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding of no prejudice
supported by instruction to take no inference from a defendant's silence in claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel for claiming in opening statement that
defendant would testify). Skunkcap has failed to show that instructions adequate
to protect a defendant when that defendant invokes his right to silence at trial are
inadequate to protect a defendant who invoked his right prior to trial.
In addition, although it was certainly error to elicit testimony that Skunkcap
had refused to be interviewed by the police, Skunkcap's argument that such was
prejudicial because there were "over a dozen questions and answers" regarding
Mr. Skunkcap's invocation of his right to remain silent, each "aggregat[ing]" the
"prejudicial impact" (Appellant's brief, p. 63-65) can most charitably be called
hyperbolic. Skunkcap is apparently including questions like "0. And was that in
an interview room? A Yes, Detective Interview Room A" and "0. Do you see
that person here in the courtroom today? A Yes I do. O. Would you please point
him out and describe his clothing? A He is sitting at the defense table, black
jeans and black checkered shirt" among his "over a dozen questions"
aggregating prejudice. (#34747 Tr., p. 405, L. 9 - p. 407, L. 19.)
Evidence of Skunkcap's refusal to be interviewed by the police was
erroneously admitted,

without objection.

Skunkcap has the burden of

demonstrating from the record a reasonable probability that this error changed
the outcome of his trial. Because the district court instructed the jury about the
right to not give a statement and that Skunkcap's exercise of that right should not
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be held against him, and because the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming,
Skunkcap has failed to show that the error rises to the level of prejudice required
under fundamental error review.

VIII.
Skunkcap's Argument That The District Court Failed To Understand It Had
Discretion To Run The Enhanced Eluding Sentence Concurrently Is Based On A
Misrepresentation Of The Record
Skunkcap was allowed to withdraw his plea to the persistent violator
enhancement in docket number 34746.

(#38249 R, pp. 1-20, 24-25.)

After

Skunkcap was again convicted of being a persistent violator (#38249 R, pp. 10712), the court entered judgment sentencing Skunkcap on the newly tried
enhancement only (#38249 R, pp. 114-16). Skunkcap filed a Rule 35 motion
claiming that the new sentence on the enhancement only was illegal because the
sentence for the enhanced eluding conviction was necessarily vacated upon
granting the motion to withdraw the plea to the enhancement and also requesting
that the court exercise its discretion and reduce the sentence. (#38249 R, pp.
119-21.)

The district court agreed that the entire sentence for the enhanced

eluding had been vacated and granted the motion in part, denied the request for
leniency, and reinstated the original eluding sentence. (#38249 R, pp. 134-35;
#38249 Tr., p. 326, L. 1 - p. 327, L. 19.)
Skunkcap claims that the district court denied his motion asserting that the
entire enhanced eluding sentence had been vacated, and therefore did not
understand it had discretion to reduce that sentence or run it concurrently with
the sentence for the enhanced grand theft. (Appellant's brief, pp. 56-60.) This
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argument is supported by, first, claiming that the part of the district court's order
denying reconsideration is actually the part of the order addressing the claim that
the court should have addressed the entire enhanced sentence (Appellant's brief,
pp. 58-59) and, second, citing to the transcript of the sentencing hearing that
preceded the filing of the motion in question to claim that the court "failed to
recognize that it had the authority to determine whether this sentence would be
consecutive or concurrent to his sentence for grand theft" (Appellant's brief, p.
59 (citing "38249 Tr., p.315, Ls.11-16")). The language in the challenged order
says exactly the opposite of Skunkcap's appellate claim:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Rule 35 Motion is
GRANTED in part in that the Court has the ability and will
reconsider the original sentence on the charge of Eluding in this
matter along with the sentence on the enhancement charge of
Persistent Violator. The Court will further reconsider whether to run
this case concurrent or consecutive to Defendant's other case, CR2006-22110-FE.
(#38249 R., p. 135.) Likewise, the transcript of the relevant hearing also shows
that the district court understood it had authority to run the sentences
concurrently if it chose to. (#38249 Tr., p. 326, Ls. 1-11 (district court stated that
it had read the authority provided by defense counsel and agreed with counsel
that it had authority to review the eluding sentence and run it concurrently with
the grand theft).) Skunkcap's argument is premised upon a misrepresentation of
the record and is therefore without merit.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgments in both
cases.

DATED this 5th day of September, 2012.
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